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Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to examine the impact of disclosure regulation on the levels of bias and accuracy
in management earnings forecasts disclosed in the prospectuses of Malaysian initial public offering (IPO).
Specifically, the authors investigated the two environments of regulation (mandatory versus voluntary) to
draw some conclusions regarding the benefits of regulating disclosure of management earnings forecasts.
Design/methodology/approach – A sample of 111 Malaysian IPOs listing on the Main Market of Bursa
Malaysia from January 1, 2004 to February 29, 2012 was used. The paper uses both univariate and
multivariate statistical analyses on this sample of IPOs.
Findings – The empirical results of these multivariate regressions indicated that disclosure regulation has
positive and significant impact on the bias and accuracy of management earnings forecasts disclosed in IPO
prospectus. In general, the study results suggest that using disclosure regulation to improve the quality of IPO
earnings forecasts can be, to some extent, an effective strategy.
Practical implications – The findings of this study have important implications for regulators and
investors. The findings can provide them some relevant insights on the improvements to the earnings
forecasts accuracy and trends of the forecast (optimistic or pessimistic) after the change from mandatory to
voluntary disclosure. Thus, the authorities may learn whether this change is an effective policy or whether the
regime of mandatory disclosure was better for IPO companies and should be reversed.
Originality/value – This study is regarded as the first attempt to investigate the impact of reforms in
disclosure regulation on the quality of management earnings forecasts of IPO prospectuses in a developing
nation such as Malaysia. In spite of this, the paper focuses on a single country, and it contributes significant
insights to the debate about the credibility of IPO management earnings forecasts.
Keywords Malaysia, IPOs, Disclosure regulation, Earnings forecasts accuracy,
Earnings forecasts bias
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Earnings forecasts research has been significantly supported by the increased condensation
on information usage by the capital market (Brown, 1993). Lack of information in capital
market economy can hinder the efficient allocation of resources. However, this issue can be
resolved through regulations that require issuing quality information (Bushee et al., 2010).
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Chin et al. (2011) evidenced that disclosure regulations prevent the probability of investor’s
mispricing of stocks. The information asymmetry between IPO company insiders and
investors can be mitigated by issuing earnings forecasts in the IPO prospectuses (Firth et al.,
2012), which will lead, in turn, to decreasing the problems of adverse selection and moral
hazard in the IPO market. However, as the earnings forecasts are the only formal source of
information that users, including investors, can access, regulatory agencies are concerned as
to whether or not the forecasts in the IPO prospectuses are accurate and unbiased (El-Rajabi
and Gunasekaran, 2006; Ahmad-Zaluki and Wan-Hussin, 2010).
Earnings forecasts disclosures in IPO prospectus can be voluntary or mandatory, based
on the regulations governing the country in which the company intends to go public. For
example, in the USA, an IPO prospectus does not often disclose forecasting information as
the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) does not mandate it. In addition, this is also to
protect the IPO companies from legal action, which they can face, if they have failed to
achieve the expectations (Clarkson et al., 1992; Jaggi, 1997).
Equity IPOs are considered important in Malaysia (Ammer and Ahmad-Zaluki, 2015).
Over the last 20 years, Malaysian authorities have amended IPO regulations numerous times
to enhance the IPO process. The present study seeks to examine whether or not the Securities
Commission ’s (SC) (SC, 2008) regulatory initiatives and reforms that address the earnings
forecasts of IPO may have inadvertently facilitated opportunistic reporting practices and
affected forecasting behaviors of issuers. The focus of this study is on the shift in disclosure
regulations of earnings forecasts issued by SC from mandatory to voluntary. Specifically, the
key objective of our study is to answer the question, “do voluntary earnings forecasts
regulatory regime provide the IPO market with more credible information than is provided
by the mandatory earnings forecasts regulatory regime?”. The inclusion of earnings
forecasts disclosures in the prospectuses of Malaysian IPOs was mandatory until January
2008, when the SC changed it to be on a voluntary basis[1]. The liberalizing of earnings
forecasts disclosure from mandatory to voluntary was a result of the uncertainties about
underlying assumptions in living up to the financial forecasts (SC, 2008). In addition, this is
to align disclosure with the international practices, as majority of the countries require
earnings forecasts to be published only on a voluntary basis.
It is noteworthy that from the investor’s point of view, regulatory intervention could
change the manner in which investors obtain and interpret the information of IPO company.
Investors may spend less when they acquire information directly from the companies and
not as much as compared to when they depend on information coming from financial
analysts or media (Truong and Dunstan, 2011). Nevertheless, investors may be confused in
the midst of information, a significant portion of which may not be important to them in light
of the mandatory regime and none or limited information in case of voluntary regime.
Therefore, they turn back to financial analysts and media for information. From a regulatory
perspective, it is thus important to comprehend the circumstances upon which a mandatory
disclosure or a voluntary disclosure regulation is in effect when providing the right level of
information to rectify market expectations of companies’ earnings forecasts and enhance the
capital market efficiency and integrity.
This study used a sample of 111 IPO companies that went public over the period 2004 to
2012. Interestingly, for multivariate analysis, we find that disclosure regulation has positive
and significant impact on the bias and accuracy of management earnings forecasts disclosed
in IPO prospectus. However, the results of univariate analysis indicate that regulation has no
impact on the bias and accuracy of management earnings forecasts. Surprisingly, the results
show that earnings forecasts under voluntary regime have become less accurate and more







































propose that using disclosure regulation to enhance forecast accuracy of IPOs can be, to some
extent, an effective strategy.
Our study contributes to the literature dedicated to IPO in several ways. First, there are
very limited studies on the influences of securities regulations on the disclosure of earnings
forecasts of IPO companies in emerging markets (Jelic et al., 1998; Gounopoulos, 2011). Thus,
as every IPO market is unique owing to its background, it is highly important for this paper
to extend the previous works by investigating the issue of regulating IPO earnings forecasts
in Malaysian IPO market, an emerging market. Specifically, there are some reasons that
provide the basis for more research into this issue in Malaysia. First, in Malaysia, whether
the regulatory change from mandatory to voluntary can enhance the credibility of IPO
earnings forecasts disclosure is still an open empirical question. Second, regulations applied
to Malaysian IPOs since 1996 have intended to enhance the accuracy of earnings forecast.
Third, there is a lack of noticeable action from the regulator toward the unfavorable activities
by the issuing companies (Ismail and Weetman, 2007). Fourth, the attributes of management
earnings forecasts will be different based on the level of litigation risk, which is considered
low in Malaysia compared to other countries. Finally, the evidences obtained for the impact
of regulation on management earnings forecasts quality are mixed (Sun and Liu, 2009;
Gounopoulos et al., 2013), which can be attributed to the fact that each country has its own
different regulatory frameworks and different economic environments.
Second, our results add to the evidence that the reforms of public enforcement in Malaysia
have had, to some extent, a positive impact on the behavior of corporate disclosure. This
paper improves our understanding concerning the advantages of regulating management
earnings forecasts disclosure. We use the most recent data available on issued earnings
forecasts in the Malaysian IPO prospectuses, hence providing evidence from a developing
economy. Third, this study has useful implications to regulators in light of the consequences
of regulations, as it is made clear to them how IPO regulations can be enhanced to reduce the
issuer’s opportunistic behavior and to safeguard the investor’s interests. Our results provide
additional information to be used in policy deliberations by these regulators. In addition, our
results give valuable information to investors for their future investment decision-making.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature
review and the testable hypotheses under this study. Section 3 describes the sample selection
and research methods, while Section 4 provides the results of univariate and multivariate
analyses. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Literature review and hypotheses development
Earnings forecasts disclosure is based on the assumption that the market is imperfect, so the
regulation is needed to level the field for the good of the public (Pedwell et al., 1994; Ramnath
et al., 2008). Under the mandatory disclosure, the potential investors can expose low-quality
IPOs and differentiate them from capable companies. This is because low-quality IPO
companies have neither the ability nor the incentive to issue accurate earnings forecasts
(Gounopoulos et al., 2013). On the contrary, these IPOs can hide their low quality under the
voluntary regime. Furthermore, mandatory disclosure encourages some high-quality IPO
companies that are still reluctant to disclose their earnings forecasts under the voluntary
regime. For the environment of voluntary earnings forecasts, every IPO company should
think carefully as to whether or not to incorporate earnings forecasts disclosure in its
prospectuses. This is due to the fact that if the company decides to disclose earnings
forecasts, the main concern is the spending of a large amount of money to ensure that it will
issue an accurate and conservative (i.e. less bias) figure. On the other hand, if the IPO








































management to the market that their company is of a low quality. When there is no
mandatory disclosure regulation, the decision to voluntary disclose information depends on
the nature of the information held by managers, the incentives given to them, companies
circumstances and the reaction experienced by investors, analysts or media toward the
disclosure (Truong and Dunstan, 2011).
Ismail and Weetman (2007) investigated the influence of change in regulation and
economic conditions on the accuracy of earnings forecasts[2]. They indicated that while the
economic condition is shown to be significantly related with the accuracy of forecasts, the
regulation has an insignificant effect. Gounopoulos et al. (2013) found that pessimistic bias
during the mandatory period turned to optimistic bias in the voluntary period. They showed
that the accuracy of earnings forecasts improved after the regulation changed to voluntary
disclosures, whereby companies that make forecasts, are considered as mature companies. In
their further analyses, they found that for the year following an IPO, the magnitude of
earnings management is much higher for mandatory forecasts companies than for
companies that issued forecasts under voluntary regime. Gallery et al. (2011) examined the
effect of new regulatory improvement (Corporate Law Economic Reform Program [CLERP]
and Australian Securities Exchange [ASX]) on the accuracy of management earnings
forecasts of Australian IPOs during the period of 1998 to 2003[3]. They found that regulatory
modifications have been effective in enhancing the accuracy of earnings forecasts. In
Taiwanese IPO market, Jaggi et al. (2006) studied the influence of regulation disclosure on
759 IPO earnings forecasts during 1994 to 2001[4]. Their results showed that the disclosure
regulation resulted in more optimistic forecasts than conservative forecasts, particularly for
IPOs estimating improved performance in the forecast year relative to the preceding year.
In a related study, Pedwell et al. (1994) conducted a comparison between the mandatory
earnings forecasts in New Zealand versus the voluntary earnings forecasts in Canada. They
found that the mandatory disclosure regime might be unsuitable for some companies,
particularly those companies that are still in a start-up position and operating in a highly
unstable environment. In other words, these companies are not expected to possess the
necessary resources and experience to provide accurate forecasts. Consequently, from this
point of view, mandatory forecasts may actually reduce the value of earnings forecasts as a
signaling mechanism by requiring companies that would not otherwise forecast, to do so.
Their findings indicate that regulations preventing such companies from forecasting could
be a more suitable regulatory policy.
Sun and Liu (2009) investigated whether the IPO penalty regulation can affect the quality
of disclosed earnings forecasts[5]. Their results show that IPO earnings forecasts have been
less optimistic and more accurate after the regulation was announced. Moreover, they
examined the effect of change in the regulation of disclosure from mandatory to voluntary on
the credibility of earnings forecasts. They found an insignificant difference in either forecast
bias or forecast accuracy between voluntary and mandatory disclosure regimes. Similarly,
Kao et al. (2009) found that penalty regulations disclosures have prevented the IPO
companies from undertaking overoptimistic earnings forecast and, thus, have a positive
effect on the IPO companies’ behavior.
The theory of voluntary disclosure enhances that disclosure is used as an instrument for
decreasing the information asymmetry between the management and investors (Clarkson
et al., 2008; Guidry and Patten, 2012). Further, signaling theory reveals that earnings
forecasts have signaling power, as the management reveals them as private information to
the less-informed investors (Verrecchia, 1983). Clarkson et al. (1992) referred to signaling
theory to clarify why earnings forecasts are issued. They examined the hypothesis







































disclose their earnings forecasts to distinguish themselves from companies with poor
performances. Furthermore, Lev and Penman (1990) reported that companies with good
news to publish do voluntarily issue forecasts to differentiate themselves from companies
with “worse news”. Therefore, IPOs who voluntarily include management earnings forecasts
in their prospectuses are supposed to be different in terms of the levels of bias and accuracy
of their earnings forecasts. They are supposed to issue more accurate and optimistic earnings
forecasts. Self-selection theory addresses the issue of disclosing overoptimistic earnings
forecasts (Gounopoulos et al., 2013). McNichols and O’Brien (1997) examined the association
between the recommendations of analysts and the earnings forecast. They found that there
is selectivity in the analysts recommendations based on whether the information concerning
the company is favorable or unfavorable.
Based on the above theories, previous studies and arguments, we hypothesize that:
H1. IPO earnings forecasts have been more optimistic under the voluntary regime than
mandatory regime.
H2. IPO earnings forecasts have been more accurate under the voluntary regime than
mandatory regime.
3. Research design
3.1 Sample and summary statistics
During the period from 1 January 2004 to 29 February 2012, 183 new issues were listed on the
Main Market of Bursa Malaysia. The companies satisfying the following criteria are
included in this study:
• IPO prospectuses as well as annual reports for the IPO year are available; and
• IPO prospectuses contain information on earnings forecasts.
Table I shows the breakdown of the sample by year of listing (column 1) and is split between
companies that made mandatory earnings forecasts (columns 3 and 4) versus voluntary
earnings forecasts (columns 5 and 6). During the mandatory sample period (Jan 2004-Jan
2008), 117 companies provided earnings forecasts information in their IPO prospectus.
However, during the voluntary period (Feb 2008-Feb 2012), from the total sample of 66 IPOs,
only 12 companies disclosed earnings forecasts information. The remaining 54 IPO
Table I.
Descriptive summary
of the distribution of






IPO year Total sample
Forecasted earnings
Mandatory Voluntary
Provide forecasts No forecasts Provide forecasts No forecasts
2004 41 41 – – –
2005 33 33 – – –
2006 18 18 – – –
2007 23 23 – – –
2008 15 2 – 8 5
2009 11 – – – 11
2010 23 – – 3 20
2011 17 – – 1 16
2012a 2 – – – 2
Total 183 117 0 12 54








































companies decided not to issue earnings forecasts in their prospectuses. Thus, they will be
eliminated from our sample.
Further, following Karamanou and Vafeas (2005), and Ahmad-Zaluki and
Wan-Hussin (2010), companies in finance, close-end fund and real estate investment
trust are excluded because they have different regulatory requirements governing their
practices on disclosure. Therefore, three companies from the finance sector, 14 real estate
investment trusts and one closed-end fund are excluded from our sample. After taking
into account these criteria, the number of companies included in our final sample is 111
IPO companies (102 IPOs under mandatory regime and 9 IPOs under voluntary regime).
We then classified the 111 IPOs that provided earnings forecasts based on their
industrial sector. Forty-one per cent of our sample is from the industrial product sector
(46 IPO companies), followed by 26.13 per cent from the trading/services sector (29 IPO
companies) and 22.52 per cent from the consumer products sector (25 IPO companies).
Only 3 per cent of our sample is from the properties sector. The other IPOs are from
plantation, construction and technology sectors.
3.2 Methods
We conducted both univariate analysis and multivariate analysis to examine the two
hypotheses regarding the impact of change in the disclosure regulation of earnings forecasts
from mandatory to voluntary on its bias and accuracy.
Following previous studies (Firth and Smith, 1992; Pedwell et al., 1994; Gounopoulos,
2003), we measured the forecast error by using three error metrics. These metrics are forecast
error (FER), absolute forecast error (AFER) and squared forecast error (SQFER). FER
estimates the bias between the earnings forecasts in the IPO prospectus and actual earnings
in annual report, which mostly indicates the direction of whether managers have been
optimistic or pessimistic in their earnings forecasts[6]. AFER and SQFER show the general
level of accuracy without considering whether the forecast is optimistic or pessimistic.
Moreover, Bhaskar and Morris (1984) and Firth and Smith (1992) contended that the SQFER
provides more weight to great errors. These metrics of forecast error are given by:
FERit  (AEit  FEit)/FEit (1)
AFERit  (AEit  FEit)/FEit (2)
SQFERit  (AEit  FEit)/FEit2 (3)
where FERit is the forecast error, AFERit is the absolute forecast error, SQFERit is the
squared forecast error, AEit is the actual earnings of company i for the period t and FEit is the
forecast earnings as given in the IPO prospectus of company i for the period t. All FER, AFER
and SQFER of IPO management earnings forecasts disclosed under the voluntary regimes
are compared with those forecasts disclosed under mandatory regime using univariate
analysis.
To further examine the two hypotheses of this study, we also performed a multivariate
OLS regression. We regressed the level of FER, AFER and SQFER on the main tested
variable (regulation) and on other nine control variables: underwriter’s reputation, auditor’s
quality, company size, company age, forecast horizon, financial leverage, management







































FERit(AFERit) (SQFERit)  0  1REGit  2UNDRWit  3 AUDit  4SIZEit
 5 AGEit  6 FHORIZONit  7LEVit
 8 MOWNit  9 INDUSTRYit  
(4)
where FERit is the difference between actual earnings and the earnings forecasts scaled by
absolute earnings forecasts. AFERit is the absolute difference between actual earnings and
the earnings forecasts scaled by absolute earnings forecasts. SQFERit is the squared of
difference between actual earnings and the earnings forecasts scaled by earnings forecasts.
REGit is a dummy variable, which equals to “1” if a company went public after 1 February
2008, and “0” otherwise (before 1st February 2008). UNDRWit is the ringgit value of all shares
underwritten by the underwriter and scaled by the total ringgit value of all IPOs in the study
sample. AUDit is a binary variable, which equals to “1” if the auditor of IPO company is Big
4 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte, KPMG and Ernst & Young) and “0” otherwise. SIZEit is
the natural logarithm of total assets, at the date of IPO prospectus. AGEit is the natural
logarithm of (1 number of years between the date of establishment and the date of IPO).
FHORIZONit is the number of months from the date of management earnings forecast
(prospectus date) to end of the period that the forecasts are made for. LEVit is the percentage
of total debt to total assets. MOWNit is the percentage of common shares directly owned by
executive directors. INDUSTRYit is a dummy variable taking the value of “1” if the company
is industrial classified consisting of industrial products and consumer products sectors,
otherwise INDUSTRYit is coded “0” if IPO is non-industrial classified.
We included this set of control variables as it has been found in prior literature to be
associated with the quality of management earnings forecasts. Underwriters are considered
as dependable party for providing the information, as well as alleviating the problem of
information asymmetry between the issuing IPO company and outside investors (Dunbar,
2000). Chen et al. (2001) argue that underwriters have an obvious motivation to strongly
scrutinize the earnings forecasts, as the large forecast errors can damage their reputation.
Firth and Smith (1992) and Brown et al. (2000) indicated that the higher the reputation of
underwriters, the higher will be the accuracy of earnings forecasts. Our study predicts that
there is a positive relationship between underwriter prestige and the level of conservative
and accuracy of earnings forecasts (i.e. negative relationship with FER, AFER and SQFER).
The auditor’s responsibility in an IPO is to provide reliability to the financial disclosure
incorporated in the prospectus. Selecting reputable auditors can be shown as a signaling
mechanism by companies with more favorable information (Titman and Trueman, 1986).
Like underwriters, the large errors of forecasts will harm the auditors’ reputation, and thus
they have to ensure the quality of earnings forecasts. Some studies find a positive
relationship between auditor’s reputation and the earnings forecasts’ accuracy (Hartnett and
Römcke, 2000; Cheng and Firth, 2000; Ahmad-Zaluki and Wan-Hussin, 2010). We predict
that IPO companies audited by one of the Big 4 should disclose more conservative and more
accurate earnings forecast relative to companies that are not audited by one of the Big 4.
Another factor that is expected to affect forecasting accuracy and bias is the company
size. Firth and Smith (1992) and Mak (1994) argued that large companies are able to issue
more accurate forecast, as they can use the best expertise and modern sophisticated
forecasting methods. Chen et al. (2001) found that company size is negatively related to the
forecasts error. Further, Jelic et al. (1998) reported the same results but not significantly
related to forecast error. However, Lonkani and Firth (2005) and Mnif (2010) found that larger
IPO companies are inclined to provide less accurate earnings forecast than smaller








































supposes that company size is negatively related with FER, AFER and SQFER (i.e.
positively associated with the conservative and accurate earnings forecasts).
The age of company can be considered as a risk factor. Bukh et al. (2005) argued that a
more established company is related with less risk. Owing to the fact that past data were a
vital input to forecast earnings, Jelic et al. (1998) argued that the earnings forecasts for short
or no previous operating history is expected to be more difficult. From this viewpoint, the
number of years the company has been in business can impact the quality of earnings
forecasts issued in IPO prospectuses. Therefore, our study predicts that company age is
positively related with more conservative and accurate earnings forecasts.
It has been argued by Chen et al. (2001) that the longer the forecasts horizon, the greater
the forecasting errors. This means that, the forecasts conducted near to the end of the forecast
period will contain an improved set of information on which the forecasts are based (Jaggi,
1997). Hence, we expect that the forecast horizon is negatively related with the conservative
and accurate level of earnings forecasts (i.e. positive with FER, AFER and SQFER).
Companies with high leverage usually have volatile earnings, and therefore it becomes
more difficult for them to forecast their earnings (Firth and Smith, 1992; Mohamad et al.,
1994). Thus, it can be argued that the more leverage a company has, the more related risk
exist in its earnings and cash flows. Thus, we predict that higher leverage may lead to the
higher forecasts bias and errors.
Hossain et al. (1994) reported that the level of voluntary disclosure differs with the
structure of ownership. The level of managerial ownership in the company is a tool for
guaranteeing management–shareholder alignment of interests (Demirag et al., 2000). For
IPOs, the management ownership can affect the practices of disclosure of the company and,
therefore, affect the level of disclosure included in the IPO prospectus (Bukh et al., 2005).
Thus, managers are expected to support more monitoring on the financial disclosures. We
predict that the percentage of management ownership is negatively related with FER, AFER
and SQFER. Finally, Chan et al. (1996) argued that industries’ sectors can be related with
accuracy of earnings forecasts, as it is more difficult to forecast the earnings for some
industries than others. This is because every industry sector has its own competition and
difficulties (Gounopoulos, 2003) and has different economic cycles and regulations (Jelic et al.,
1998).
4. Empirical results
4.1 Descriptive statistics and univariate comparison of regulatory regimes
Table II presents the summary statistics of forecast error, absolute forecast error and
squared forecast error. The data are separated into the full sample (111 IPO companies)
reported in Panel A, the mandatory disclosure regime sample (102 IPO companies) reported
in Panel B and the voluntary disclosure regime sample (9 IPO companies) reported in Panel C.
Focusing first on Panel A (full sample), the results of mean (median) of FER is 3.16 per cent
(1.44 per cent), respectively. This positive sign of mean shows that, on average, the actual
earnings are higher than the forecasted earnings in the prospectuses, and therefore the
forecasts are pessimistic. The mean of FER is substantially lower than the mean reported in
previous studies in Malaysia (e.g. 9.34 per cent in Mohamad et al., 1994; 33.37 per cent in Jelic
et al., 1998). This indicates a general decrease in the bias of earnings forecasts of Malaysian
IPOs over time. While our study documents a positive mean of forecasts error, the study of
Ahmad-Zaluki and Wan-Hussin (2010) reveals optimistic FER with a negative mean of 3.50
per cent. Ahmad-Zaluki and Wan-Hussin (2010) attributed their result of over-forecasting in
earnings to the economic situations of their used sample period (1999-2006), which was the







































In Table II, Panels B and C present surprising results on the bias of earnings forecasts (FER)
under the two disclosure regimes of mandatory and voluntary regulations. The results
indicate a positive mean of 2.92 per cent for IPO companies that published earnings forecasts
in their prospectuses through the mandatory period, and a positive mean of 5.86 per cent for
IPOs issued earnings forecasts during the voluntary period. This indicates that the FER
becomes more pessimistic under the voluntary disclosure, which contradicts our first
hypothesis. Our results are also in contrast to Gounopoulos et al. (2013), who found that the
pessimistic bias during the mandatory regime turned to be optimistic under the voluntary
environment. However, the t-value and z-value for both of t-test and Mann–Whitney
nonparametric test for differences in means and medians reported in Panel D show that there
is an insignificant difference between FER under the two disclosures environments.
The situation is also similar when we test the AFER and SQFER. The mean (median) of
AFER for the overall sample is 23.36 per cent (9.48 per cent), respectively. This reveals that
the accuracy of earnings forecasts is higher than the accuracy reported in the prior studies in
Malaysia (e.g. 28 per cent in Mohamad et al., 1994), but similar to the result of 23.76 per cent
reported by Ahmad-Zaluki and Wan-Hussin (2010), Thailand (e.g. 35.76 per cent in Lonkani
and Firth, 2005) and Australia (e.g. 34.49 per cent in Firth et al., 2012). On the other hand, it
is lower than what has been found in Hong Kong (e.g. 7.26 per cent in McGuinness, 2005) and
New Zealand (e.g. 11.10 per cent in Firth, 1997). The mean of SQFER for the full sample is










FER (%) AFER (%) SQFER (%)
Panel A: Full sample (January 2004-February 2012) (n  111)
Mean 3.16 23.36 15.53
p-value 0.401 0.000 0.006
Median 1.44 9.48 0.90
p-value 0.679 0.000 0.000
SD 39.46 31.88 57.86
Minimum 85.49 0.13 0.00
Maximum 238.27 238.27 567.75
Panel B: Mandatory disclosure regime (January 2004- January 2008) (n  102)
Mean 2.92 22.96 15.81
p-value 0.461 0.000 0.009
Median 1.08 9.40 0.88
p-value 0.764 0.000 0.000
SD 39.85 32.63 60.24
Minimum 85.49 0.13 0.00
Maximum 238.27 238.27 567.75
Panel C: Voluntary disclosure regime (February 2008- February 2012) (n  9)
Mean 5.86 28.00 12.35
p-value 0.645 0.006 0.032
Median 5.41 28.58 8.17
p-value 0.641 0.008 0.008
SD 36.75 22.52 14.34
Minimum 56.00 5.41 0.29
Maximum 58.10 58.11 33.76
Panel D: Test of difference between mandatory and voluntary disclosure regimes
t-test 0.229 0.617 0.453








































be attributed to the fact that SQFER provides more weight to great errors (Firth and Smith,
1992).
As we highlighted earlier, the introduction of the voluntary regime appears to
enhance the credibility of earnings forecasts, but, surprisingly, Panels B and C in Table II
show the opposite. The AFER level under the voluntary disclosure (28.00 per cent) is higher
than the AFER level under the mandatory disclosure (22.96 per cent). This indicates that the
voluntary earnings forecasts are less accurate than mandatory earnings forecasts. In
Table II, Panel D provides evidence of the univariate test of our second hypotheses. Both
t-test and Mann–Whitney test indicate an insignificant difference between AFER under the
two disclosures environments; a result that is inconsistent with our second hypothesis.
However, this result is consistent with Sun and Liu (2009) who reported insignificant
difference in either forecast bias or forecast accuracy between voluntary and mandatory
disclosure.
Interestingly, the result obtained from the SQFER metric is different. The SQFER level
under the voluntary disclosure regime (12.35 per cent) is lower than the SQFER level under
the mandatory disclosure (15.81 per cent). This means that the voluntary earnings forecasts
are more accurate than mandatory earnings forecasts, consistent with our second
hypothesis. Nevertheless, based on the t-test and Mann–Whitney test, the difference between
SQFER under the two disclosures environments is still statistically insignificant.
To justify the conclusion derived from comparing these two regimes, it can be suggested
that mandatory earnings forecasts can force IPO companies to forecast although they have
neither the motivations nor the capability to do so. Hence, the bias is positive (pessimistic),
and the absolute forecast error is significantly different from zero (inaccurate) (the findings in
Panel B for one sample t-test and Mann–Whitney test show that the mean and median of
AFER are significantly higher than zero [p-value0.000; p-value0.000]). The reason why
there is no improvement in the accuracy under the voluntary period may be due to the very
few quality IPO companies that release information on earnings forecast after the regulatory
change. This keeps the level of accuracy and bias as it was during the mandatory period.
This, in turn, can be attributed to the lack of management confidence under voluntary
regime, as only 12 IPOs out of 66 Malaysian IPOs provided forecasts. Furthermore, the
findings presented in Table II are based on univariate statistics. Hence, dissimilarities in the
characteristics of IPO companies may, to some extent, describe some of the differences
between the observed levels of forecast bias and accuracy. Therefore, the findings of
voluntary regime may not necessarily be representative of the findings that would be
obtained under this disclosure regime with small-size sample and different characteristics
(i.e. size, age and leverage).
To shed more light on the errors of earnings forecasts, Table III presents the frequency
distribution of FER and AFER. For FER, it is clear that out of 111 Malaysian IPO companies,
56 (52 under mandatory and four under voluntary disclosure) sample companies (50.45 per
cent) meet the required regulatory limit, which is within the  10 per cent range tolerated by
the SC[7]. This percentage is lower than what was reported in the prior studies (e.g. 56.6 per
cent in Ahmad-Zaluki and Wan-Hussin, 2010) and higher than 46 per cent, obtained in Jelic
et al. (1998). Alternatively, 49.55 per cent of the companies in our sample had FERs outside
the SC tolerance level.
Table III also reveals that out of the full sample of 102 mandatory earnings forecasts, 56
IPO companies have positive forecast errors and the remaining 46 IPO companies have
negative forecast errors. Therefore, the actual earnings for most Malaysian IPO companies







































disclosure of earnings forecasts have been under-forecasting their earnings in the prospectus
and are, on average, conservative in their disclosure.
For the IPOs that disclosed earnings forecasts under the voluntary disclosure environment,
the findings show that out of the full sample of nine IPOs, five have positive forecast errors and
four companies have negative forecast errors. Thus, like the mandatory regime, a majority of IPO
companies under the voluntary regime are conservative in their disclosure. As for the AFER, the
majority of IPOs in both samples of mandatory and voluntary disclosures experience an AFER of
less than 10 per cent (52 IPOs listed under mandatory regime and four IPOs listed under the
voluntary regime).
Table IV presents the descriptive statistics on the independent and control variables used
in the regression analysis. On average, 91.89 per cent (102 companies) of our sample has been
issued under the regulated earnings forecasts (mandatory disclosure). The average of




and AFER by year of




Listing year (%) 10 10 to 0 0 to 10 10 Total FER (%)
Panel A: Percentages of forecast error (FER)
Mandatory disclosure regime (January 2004-January 2008) (n  102)
2004 13 9 12 7 41 1.36
2005 10 5 6 5 26 5.84
2006 0 3 7 4 14 6.12
2007 2 4 5 8 19 9.03
2008 0 0 1 1 2 13.13
2004-2008 25 21 31 25 102 2.92
Voluntary disclosure regime (February 2008- February 2012) (n  9)
2008 2 2 1 3 8 5.92
2009 0 0 0 0 0 –
2010 0 0 1 0 1 5.41
2011 0 0 0 0 0 –
2012 0 0 0 0 0 –
2008-2012 2 2 2 3 9 5.86
Total 27 23 33 28 111 3.16
Listing year (%) 10 10 to 40 40 to 60  60 Total AFER (%)
Panel B: Percentages of absolute forecast error (AFER)
Mandatory disclosure regime (January 2004-January 2008) (n  102)
2004 21 11 3 6 41 29.51
2005 11 8 4 3 26 25.62
2006 10 4 0 0 14 8.98
2007 9 6 3 1 19 20.85
2008 1 1 0 0 2 13.13
2004-2008 52 30 10 10 102 22.96
Voluntary disclosure regime (February 2008- February 2012) (n  9)
2008 3 2 3 0 8 30.82
2009 0 0 0 0 0 –
2010 1 0 0 0 1 5.41
2011 0 0 0 0 0 –
2012 0 0 0 0 0 –
2008-2012 4 2 3 0 9 28.00








































share is 49.11 per cent for CIMB Investment Bank Berhad, and the minimum is 0.13 per cent
for Kenanga Investment Bank Berhad. On average, 50.45 per cent of our sample has been
audited by Big 4 audit firms. The size of the IPO companies in our sample varies
significantly. The largest company with total asset at the IPO date amounting in RM6313.79
million is KLCC Property Holdings Berhad, while a company with the lowest size of RM35.12
million is TAFI Industries Berhad. The average age of the IPOs at the time of listing is about
5.08 years. The maximum value for age is 32.67 years and minimum is 0.50 years. For the
forecast horizon, the maximum horizon is 13 months and the minimum is three months. The
mean leverage of our sample is 53.38 per cent. On average, the management of our IPO
sample owns 12.31 per cent of the shares at the time of the IPO. Finally, 63.06 per cent of the
sample is classified as industrial companies.
4.2 Results of multivariate analysis
In this study, we ran a multivariate OLS regression to examine the effect of disclosure
regulation (REG), in addition to several control variables on the bias (FER) and accuracy
(AFER and SQFER) of management earnings forecasts in Malaysian IPOs. Table V presents
the Pearson correlation matrix for the variables used in the regression. Specifically, it
indicates that certain variables are associated with each other, namely, REG is significantly
and negatively correlated with MOWN, UNDRW and AUD are significantly and positively
correlated with SIZE, SIZE is significantly and negatively correlated with MOWN and
INDUSTRY, and FHORIZON is significantly and negatively correlated with LEV. Further,
from Table V we can validate the nonexistence of multicolinearity between the variables. In
line with Field (2005), the correlation coefficient should not go further than 0.8 to avoid
multicollinearity. Therefore, as the highest correlation coefficient is 0.362, there is no





Variable Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum
REG (%) 91.89 – – – –
UNDRW (%) 15.64 10.45 17.62 0.13 49.11
AUD (%) 50.45 – – – –
SIZE (RM million) 260.61 97.83 745.19 35.12 6313.79
AGE (years) 5.08 1.67 7.23 0.50 32.67
FHORIZON (months) 7.59 7.00 2.97 3.00 13.00
LEV (%) 53.38 49.39 24.55 3.86 100.00
MOWN (%) 12.31 3.88 16.92 0.00 66.94
INDUSTRY (%) 63.06 – – – –
Notes: This table reports the descriptive statistics of the main independent and control variables for 111
IPOs that went public through the period 2004-2012. REG is a dummy variable, which equals to “1”, if a
company went public after 1st February 2008 and “ 0” otherwise (before 1st February 2008). UNDRW is the
ringgit value of all shares underwritten by the underwriter scaled by the total ringgit value of all IPOs in the
study sample. AUD is a binary variable, which equals to “1” if the auditor of IPO company is Big 4
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte, KPMG and Ernst & Young) and “0” otherwise. SIZE is the natural
logarithm of total assets, at the date of IPO prospectus. AGE is the natural logarithm of (1 number of years
between the date of establishment and the date of IPO). FHORIZON is the number of months from the date of
management earnings forecast (prospectus date) to end of the period that the forecasts are made for. LEV is the
percentage of total debt to total assets. MOWN is the percentage of common shares directly owned by
executive directors. INDUSTRY is a dummy variable taking the value of “1” if the company is industrial
classified consisting of industrial products and consumer products sectors, otherwise INDUSTRY is coded “0”







































heteroscedasticity, White’s (1980) test is applied. It shows that the assumption of
heteroscedasticity is not violated for the three models.
Table VI presents the results of the three regression analysis. The first regression model
(Model 1) tests hypothesis one, which considers the effect of disclosure regulation and other
control variables on the earnings forecasts bias. The findings of Model 1 are reported in
columns 2 and 3. We find that REG is negatively and significantly related with earnings
forecasts bias, inconsistent with our H1. This indicates that earnings forecast regulations
have prevented IPO companies from making over-optimistic earnings forecast, and thus
these regulations positively impact the IPO companies’ behavior. In other words, IPO
companies that are covered under penalty regulations are not as likely to be penalized for
forecast errors in the IPO year – a result consistent with that of Kao et al.’s (2009). Therefore,
the finding of the univariate tests of H1 still holds after regressing the REG with other control
variables.
The second and third regression models (Models 2 and 3) were tested for H2and
considered the impact of REG and other control variable on the accuracy of management
earnings forecasts. The results of Model 2 and 3 are presented in columns 4 and 5, and
columns 6 and 7, respectively. We find that, for Model 2 and Model 3, REG is
significantly and negatively associated with the both of AFER and AQFER (i.e.
positively associated with the accuracy of earnings forecasts). This result is consistent
with our stated H2. Unlike Model 1, the result of univariate test for H2 does not hold
when performing regression analysis. In general, based on the multivariate analysis, the
introduction of disclosure regulation reforms has positively impacted the accuracy of
management earnings forecasts issued in IPO prospectus. According to these findings,
while the enhancement of Malaysian disclosure regulation is deemed to positively
impact the financial environment which is consistent with the intent behind it, regulators




Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. REG 1
2. UNDRW 0.108 1
3. AUD 0.036 0.085 1
4. SIZE 0.081 0.362** 0.285** 1
5. AGE 0.131 0.100 0.140 0.128 1
6. FHORIZON 0.026 0.051 0.014 0.054 0.129 1
7. LEV 0.085 0.006 0.176 0.001 0.082 0.261** 1
8. MOWN 0.212* 0.184 0.103 0.292** 0.046 0.007 0.107 1
9. INDUSTRY 0.046 0.150 0.161 0.281** 0.094 0.141 0.009 0.022 1
Notes: This table reports Pearson correlation matrix between the variables of this study based on a sample
of 111 IPO companies. REG is a dummy variable, which equals to “1” if a company went public after 1
February 2008, and “0” otherwise (before 1st February 2008). UNDRW is the ringgit value of all shares
underwritten by the underwriter scaled by the total ringgit value of all IPOs in the study sample. AUD is a
binary variable, which equals to “1” if the auditor of IPO company is Big 4 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte,
KPMG and Ernst & Young) and “0” otherwise. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets at the date of IPO
prospectus. AGE is the natural logarithm of (1 number of years between the date of establishment and the
date of IPO). FHORIZON is the number of months from the date of management earnings forecast (prospectus
date) to end of the period that the forecasts are made for. LEV is the percentage of total debt to total assets.
MOWN is the percentage of common shares directly owned by executive directors. And INDUSTRY is a
dummy variable taking the value of “1” if the company is industrial classified consisting of industrial products
and consumer products sectors, otherwise INDUSTRY is coded “0” if IPO is non-industrial classified.








































IPO companies can benefit from such regulation to hide their low quality by not issuing
their earnings forecasts.
With regard to the results of control variables, the company’s underwriter reputation
(UNDRW) variable is reported to have the expected sign and is significantly associated
with AFER in Model 2. This finding is in line with the result reported by Chen et al.
(2001), Gounopoulos (2003) and Jog and McConomy (2003), illustrating that prestigious
underwriters are related with more accurate earnings forecasts than their disreputable
counterparts. As for auditor’s quality (AUD), and in line with the predictions, results in
Table VI indicate that AUD has a significant negative association with AFER and
SQFER in both Model 2 and Model 3, respectively. The findings reveal that there is a
difference in the forecast accuracy of companies that are audited by Big 4 or non-Big 4
firms. This result is consistent with prior Malaysian studies (Ahmad-Zaluki and
Wan-Hussin, 2010) that documented that audit firms with higher quality are related to
greater accurate earnings forecasts. In addition, this result supports the findings of
Karim et al. (2013) on Bangladeshi IPOs. Concerning the results pertaining to the
association between SIZE and AFER and SQFER, they are contrary to what was argued
that large-sized companies could be related to forecasts of higher accuracy and less bias.
This result is consistent with those of Firth and Smith’s (1992) and Ahmad-Zaluki and
Wan-Hussin’s (2010). According to Firth and Smith (1992), larger companies are more
capable of raising higher capital compared to smaller ones, and this makes it difficult for
them to accurately forecast future earnings. However, the results in Model 1 (FER)
Table VI.
Regression results for
the influence of REG




Model 1 (FER) Model 2 (AFER) Model 3 (SQFER)
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Intercept 47.613 1.54 5.534 0.23 0.463 0.04
REG 21.097 2.86*** 13.848 2.61*** 8.986 3.43***
UNDRW 0.134 1.21 0.187 2.09** 0.050 1.16
AUD 2.945 0.75 5.253 1.70* 2.579 1.70*
SIZE 2.136 0.89 2.875 1.53 0.910 1.08
AGE 3.293 1.53 1.600 0.93 0.654 0.77
FHORIZON 1.083 1.70* 0.362 0.71 0.164 0.65
LEV 4.627 0.61 4.764 0.79 2.658 0.89
MOWN 0.053 0.44 0.142 1.53 0.077 1.68*
INDUSTRY 8.557 2.16** 0.930 0.30 0.125 0.04
n 93 99 99
F-value 2.25** 2.22** 2.45***
R2 (%) 19.59 18.36 19.87
Adjusted R2 (%) 10.87 10.11 11.77
Notes: This table reports the results of OLS regressions for regulation and other control variable on earnings
forecast bias (Model 1) and earnings forecasts accuracy (Model 2 and Model 3). The dependent variables are
Earnings forecasts bias (FER)  (Actual Earnings  Forecast Earnings)/ Forecast Earnings; Earnings
forecasts accuracy (AFER)  (Actual Earnings  Forecast Earnings)/Forecast Earnings ; and (SQFER) 
[(Actual Earnings  Forecast Earnings)/Forecast Earnings]2. The experimental variable is: Regulation
(REG). The control variables are: Underwriter reputation (UNDRW); Auditor quality (AUD); Company size
(SIZE); Company age (AGE); Forecasts horizon (FHORIZON); Leverage (LEV); Management ownership
(MOWN); and Industry (INDUSTRY). The number of IPO sample is less than 111 after dealing with outliers.
Outliers are identified when the absolute values of the observations’ studentized residuals are two or greater.
Therefore, 18 IPO companies have been detected and deleted from Model 1, and 12 companies have been
detected and deleted from both Model 2 and Model 3. Results are significantly different from zero at







































showed the expected results, although no significant impact was revealed. Moreover, the
coefficient for company’s age (AGE) in the regression of Model 1 also showed the
expected negative sign but insignificant impact was reported. The regression of both
AFER and SQFER in Model 2 and Model 3 showed contradicting signs to what was
expected, indicating that mature companies face difficulties to issue accurate earnings
forecasts.
In Model 1, the forecasts horizon is positively and significantly associated with FER
as argued, but the result is contrasting for AFER and SQFER, where none of the
coefficients of the latter two are significant. The earnings forecast is a naturally
uncertain practice. It is argued by Chen and Firth (1999) that the longer the period of
earnings forecasts, the greater the uncertainty. That is, when the period of forecasts is
long, the bias of IPO earnings forecasts will be more. With regard to financial leverage
(LEV), the coefficient revealed was not in the argued direction following regression of
Model 1. The negative coefficient indicates that companies that are highly leveraged use
conservative forecasts, although the coefficient is not statistically significant. On the
other hand, the other regressions of Model 2 and Model 3 showed expected positive sign,
but the results are insignificant. The results are in line with previous studies that found
insignificant evidence on the relationship between leverage and accuracy of IPO
earnings forecast in Malaysia (Jelic et al., 1998); in Hong Kong (Jaggi, 1997; Cheng and
Firth, 2000); in New Zealand (Firth and Smith, 1992); in Thailand (Lonkani and Firth,
2005); and in Bangladesh (Karim et al., 2013). Additionally, the result for MOWN in
Model 3 (SQFER) is as expected. The results are consistent with Mnif (2010) who found
that when the percentage of shares retained by mangers of IPOs is high, it is expected
that these companies will publish more accurate earnings forecast. Finally, for the
control variable INDUSTRY, the results are significant and negative with FER in Model
1, indicating that the industrial IPO companies are linked with less biased forecasts. As
for the INDUSTRY and forecasts accuracy, the relationship is positive (i.e. negative with
AFER and SQFER), but insignificant.
5. Conclusion
Corporate disclosure is significant for the efficient performance of capital markets.
Companies generally provide information to investors either through voluntary or
mandatory disclosure. The main aim of our study is to undertake, for the first time in the
Malaysian context, a direct comparison between IPO companies that issued earnings
forecasts under the mandatory disclosure regime and IPO companies providing earnings
forecasts during the current voluntary regime. Therefore, this regulatory change
provides an opportunity to enrich this research topic, and to find out whether or not the
quality of earnings forecasts has improved after the introduction of the new voluntary
regime.
Using a unique sample of 111 Malaysian IPOs over the period 2004-2012, three error
metrics were calculated to model the earnings forecast bias and accuracy. The results of
our univariate analysis indicate that there is no improvement in the earnings forecasts
after the introduction of voluntary disclosure regime. The forecast error is more
pessimistic under the voluntary disclosure than what was observed under the
mandatory regime. For accuracy, we find different findings for AFER and SQFER. When
using AFER, our results show that the earnings forecasts become less accurate under the
voluntary regime, but there is insignificant difference between the accuracy of the
earnings forecasts under both regimes. On the other hand, when using SQFER, we find








































our results suggest that, Malaysian IPO companies did not behave more liberally during
the voluntary regime, and the sign of forecasts errors was still pessimistic as it was
under the mandatory regime. Based on these findings, the dissimilarities in the IPO
companies’ characteristics may describe, to some extent, some of the differences between
the forecast bias and accuracy levels. Hence, the voluntary regime findings may not
accurately represent the findings that would be obtained under this disclosure regime
where the sample is of small size with different characteristics (i.e. size, age and
leverage). Our regression results show that disclosure regulation is significantly related
with more conservative and accurate IPO earnings forecasts.
In sum, our results to some extent, suggest that the new regulation of earnings
forecasts disclosure (voluntary regime) does enhance the credibility of earnings
forecasts contained in Malaysian IPO prospectuses. Further, SC should motivate the
management of IPO companies to disclose earnings forecast information in their
prospectuses, as voluntary disclosure can enhance the transparency of market operation
and mitigate the asymmetry of information. Future studies should consider other
external influences, such as economic conditions, besides regulation, in the examination
of earnings forecasts accuracy.
Notes
1. The effective date of the enhanced disclosure requirements under Chapter 13 of the Prospectus
Guidelines is 1st February 2008 (SC, 2008).
2. Starting on 1st January 1996, new regulation has been implemented on Malaysian IPOs in
construction, services and specialized industries. The IPO companies under this regulation
were mandated whether to choose for a moratorium to be enforced on disposal of shares or to
offer an earnings guarantee of 90 per cent of the earnings forecasts as declared in the
prospectus.
3. The Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP Act), which was promulgated in 2000,
came with stronger disclosure requirements and tighter enforcement action by the corporate
regulator, while the announcing of Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) listing regulations
allowed a new group of new economy companies (commitments test entities) to list without a
previous history of profitability.
4. In 1991, the Taiwan Securities and Futures Exchange Commission published a regulation
mandating the IPO companies to disclose the earnings forecasts in the prospectuses as well as
release forecasts for two years following to the IPO.
5. On December 26, 1996, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission announced that there will be
penalties on IPO companies, which their earnings forecasts are significantly over-forecasted in their
IPO prospectuses. In addition, the over-forecasted IPO companies and their auditors have to
apologize and explain to the public the reasons of errors if the earnings are over-forecasted by 10-20
per cent compared to actual earnings.
6. Following the studies of Chan et al. (1996), Lonkani and Firth (2005), and El-Rajabi and
Gunasekaran (2006), our study used the forecasted and actual earnings after tax (which is disclosed
in the prospectus and in the first published annual report, respectively) in the calculation of
earnings forecasts bias and accuracy.
7. Para. 9.19 (33) of the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirement (BMLR) requires that in the case of any
deviation of 10 per cent or more between: the profit after tax and minority interest identified in a
profit estimate, projection or forecast formerly published or issued in a public document; and the
published unaudited accounts, clarification of the deviation and reconciliation thereof should be
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